Tuesday, December 30, 2008

December 26, 1862-January 5, 1863.--The Stone's River or Murfreesborough, Tenn., Campaign.

Report of Lieut. Gen. William J. Hardee, C. S. Army, commanding Army Corps.December 26, 1862-January 5, 1863.--The Stone's River or Murfreesborough, Tenn., Campaign.O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XX/1 [S# 29]
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,Tullahoma, Tenn., March 11, 1863.
General S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.
SIR: I have the honor to forward, by the hands of Col. J. H. Kelly, Eighth Arkansas Volunteers, Lieutenant-General Hardee's corps, the report of that general of the part taken by his corps in the battle of Murfreesborough, December 31 to January 3; also the reports of division and brigade commanders, including those of Major-General McCown's division, which was, during the most important part of the operations, under Lieutenant-General Hardee. Some errors and misapprehensions of Major-General Breckinridge, incorporated in his report, will be corrected by reference to copies of notes received from him on the field of battle, and which are appended to the report, with an order for the cavalry movement, indorsed by Brigadier-General Pegram as "received." To these papers, appended to General B[reckinridge]'s report, I invite special attention.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,BRAXTON BRAGG, General, Commanding.
[Inclosure.]
HEADQUARTERS HARDEE'S CORPS,Tullahoma, Tenn., February 28, 1863.
Lieut. Col. GEORGE WILLIAM BRENT, Assistant Adjutant-General.
COLONEL: After the campaign in Kentucky, our forces were collected at Murfreesborough, while the enemy gradually concentrated an army, reported 70,000 strong, around Nashville. Every preparation that forecast could suggest was made by them to crush our army and obtain possession of Central Tennessee. For nearly two months there was apparent inaction, interrupted only by skirmishes, raids, and a successful affair at Hartsville. The enemy occupied Nashville, their right extending toward Franklin and their left toward Lebanon. Our center was at Murfreesborough, under Lieutenant-General Polk, our right at Readyville, under Major-General McCown, and our left at Triune and Eagleville. Such was the situation of the armies when information was received, on December 26, that General Rosecrans was advancing with 60,000 men from Nashville against Murfreesborough. The first demonstration was made against Triune by an advance of the enemy on the Shelbyville turnpike. Cleburne's division and Adams' brigade, under my immediate command, were posted in that vicinity. The commanding general having decided to accept battle and to defend Murfreesborough, I withdrew my command the succeeding day by his order, leaving Wood's brigade and Wharton's cavalry to skirmish with the enemy near Triune. This was done boldly and successfully, and they rejoined the command on the 28th at Murfreesborough. My corps consisted of Breckinridge's and Cleburne's divisions (each of four brigades) and Wheeler's brigade of cavalry. Murfreesborough is situated 30 miles southeast of Nashville, in a fertile, gently undulating, and highly cultivated country, in the midst of the great plain that stretches from the base of the Cumberland Mountains toward Nashville. The Chattanooga Railroad, the chief' line of communication from Tennessee to the South Atlantic States, passes through it, and numerous excellent turnpikes radiate from it in every direction. Stone's River flows about 2 miles west of the town, through low banks of limestone, steep, and in some places difficult to pass, and gradually trends to the north as a tributary of the Cumberland. At this time the stream could everywhere be passed without difficulty by infantry, and at the usual fords was not more than ankle-deep, but heavy rains in a few hours swell it to an impassable torrent, and it subsides as rapidly. The road to Lebanon passes nearly due north from Murfreesborough; that to Triune nearly west; that to Salem a little south of west, and the Nashville turnpike northwest, crossing Stone's River about 1½ miles from Murfreesborough. The railroad, leaving the depot on the west of the town, crosses Stone's River about 200 yards above the turnpike ford. At 400 or 500 yards beyond this it intersects the Nashville turnpike at a very acute angle, running between it and the river for about 700 yards, when the stream turns to the east by a sharp bend, and then resumes its northern course. The field of battle offered no peculiar advantages for defense. The open fields beyond the town are fringed with dense cedar brakes, offering excellent shelter for approaching infantry, and are almost impervious to artillery. The country on every side is entirely open, and was accessible to the enemy. On Sunday morning, December 28, the troops were moved into line of battle. The river separated our right from the left. By order of the commanding general, the space between the Lebanon road and the ford on the Nashville road, making the right of the army, was occupied by my corps. I arranged my troops in two lines, Breckinridge's division forming the first line and Cleburne's the second. The former was arranged with Adams' brigade resting on the Lebanon road, about 1½ miles from the town. The line was broken by an intervening field about 300 yards wide, which was left apparently unoccupied, but was covered by the Twentieth Tennessee and [E. E.] Wright's [Tennessee]battery, of Preston's brigade, which swept it and the field in front. The remainder of Preston's brigade rested with its right in the woods, and extended along the margin of the grove, with its left toward the river. Palmer's and Hanson's brigades completed the line, with the left of Hanson resting near the ford. Cleburne's division was posted 800 yards in rear of, and parallel to, that of Breckinridge. Polk's corps extended beyond the river, with its right near the stream, and about 200 yards in advance of my left. Withers' division formed the front line of this corps, and Cheatham's the second, while McCown's division was held in reserve near the town. No movement of importance occurred until Monday evening. It was deemed necessary to hold a hill situated about 600 yards in advance of Hansen's brigade, as it commanded the sloping hill-sides toward the river in front, and from it the right of General Polk's line could be enfiladed. In the evening the enemy attempted to take this position, but was vigorously repulsed by a portion of Hansen's brigade, and the hill was occupied by our batteries. During Monday night the cavalry of Brigadier-General Wheeler, attached to my corps, was moved from our right by a circuitous route through Jefferson and La Vergne against the communications of the enemy. After making an entire circuit of the enemy's lines, this daring officer, having inflicted severe injury by the destruction of several hundred wagons and many small-arms, and by the capture of several hundred prisoners, returned through Nolensville and Triune to Murfrees-borough. The next day (Tuesday, the 30th) heavy skirmishing took place on our left between the right of the enemy and the command of Lieutenant-General Polk. In the afternoon of that day I received instructions from the commanding general to proceed to the left, to take command of McCown's division, to place it in position, and to move Cleburne's division from our extreme right in the same direction. The order was communicated to Cleburne, and I proceeded at once to the left. I found McCown's division, consisting of three brigades, in two lines--Ector's and Rains' brigades in the first, and McNair's in the second line, with Rains' brigade so situated as to be enfiladed by a battery from the enemy. Orders were given to rectify the position of Rains, and to place McNair on the first line. Cleburne's division was brought forward and placed 500 yards in rear of McCown, as a second line. During the night, the commanding general having determined to attack the enemy on our left, Brigadier-General Wharton was ordered to report to me, and I was instructed, with the two divisions mentioned and Wharton's cavalry, to commence the attack at dawn the next morning. The new position which my command now occupied is embraced in the angle between the Salem turnpike and the Triune road. About half a mile from Murfreesborough, on the Nashville road, the Wilkinson turnpike diverges to the left, passing nearly equidistant between it and the Triune road. Each of these roads crosses Stones River about 1½ miles west of the town. The river makes a bend in the shape of a horseshoe to the west, and the roads cross at the bases of the bend. The enemy's right was about three-quarters of a mile beyond the river, with their line south of the Triune road, and extending almost northwardly toward the Wilkinson pike and the Nashville road. The force under my immediate command Wednesday morning was 10,045 infantry and artillery, under McCown and Cleburne, and 2,000 cavalry, under Brigadier-General Wharton. I ordered Wharton to make a detour of the enemy's right, and to fall upon their flank and rear, while the infantry and artillery moved upon them in front. He dashed forward at a gallop at daybreak, and soon reached the Wilkinson turnpike, 2½ miles in the rear. With Colonel [John T.] Cox's command [First Confederate Cavalry], he charged with great impetuosity and took prisoners the Seventy-fifth Illinois Regiment. Captain [S. P.] Christian, of the Texas Rangers [Eighth Texas Cavalry], with four companies, at the same time charged and took a complete battery of the enemy, with all its guns, caissons, horses, and artillerists. By these dashes 1,500 prisoners fell into our hands. Wharton afterward swept around toward the Nashville turnpike, and found the enemy's cavalry in position to defend their menaced trains. Harrison, Ashby, and Hardy were ordered to charge. This was met by a counter-charge of the enemy, supposed to be the Fourth Regular Cavalry, who were routed in confusion. The entire cavalry force of the enemy was deployed beyond this point. Wharton's entire brigade was now ordered to charge; 2,000 horsemen dashed forward to the assault. The field was favorable, the charge irresistible, the conflict short. The enemy fled in wild dismay 2 miles beyond Overall's Creek, leaving in our hands several hundred wagons, 400 additional prisoners, and several pieces of artillery. The conduct of Wharton and his brigade cannot be too highly commended. After a day of brilliant achievements, he covered the left of my infantry at night. Major-General McCown having failed to get McNair's brigade on the line of battle Tuesday night, as directed by me, the brigade was moved into position early the next morning, and McCown advanced with his division against the enemy, about 600 yards distant, with McNair on the right of Ector and with Rains' brigade on the left. The division of Major-General Cleburne was about 500 yards in rear of McCown, as a second line. The two divisions were posted on the left of Lieutenant-General Polk's command. The troops advanced with animation and soon became hotly engaged. The enemy were broken and driven through a cedar brake after a rapid and successful charge by McCown's command, in which Brigadier-General [August] Willich and many prisoners were taken. A signal instance of courage was shown by Col. J. C. Burks, of the Eleventh Texas. This brave officer, though mortally wounded, still led and cheered on his regiment until he fell exhausted at its head. Another instance was shown by Sergt. A. Sims, flag-bearer of the Tenth Texas, who, seeing a Federal flag-bearer endeavoring to rally his regiment, sprang forward, seized the standard, and in the struggle both were shot down, waving their flags with their last breath. The Federal flag was captured. I had ordered McCown and Cleburne, as they crushed the line of the enemy, to swing round by a continued change of direction to the right, with Polk's left as a pivot, while Wharton was to make a diversion on their flank and rear. This was done by Cleburne, but was not so promptly executed by McCown, on account of the position of the enemy in his front. McCown continued westwardly, fighting toward Overall's Creek, far to our left, while Cleburne, executing the maneuver, changed his direction northeastwardly toward the Wilkinson turnpike, which placed him on the right of McCown and filled the interval between McCown and Polk. The line, now single and without support, engaged and drove the enemy with great carnage through the fields and cedar brakes which lie between the Triune and Wilkinson roads. Before this gap in the line was filled by Cleburne, McCown's right flank was exposed. McNair halted his brigade, while Liddell advanced gallantly, filling the interval, covered McNair's unprotected right, and engaged a superior force of the enemy posted behind a rail fence. These two brigades charged the enemy with impetuosity, took their battery, and pursued their broken and fleeing regiments before Ector and Rains could be brought into action. General McNair left a sick bed to enter the battle, and after conducting his brigade with gallantry, becoming exhausted, was ordered to retire from the field. The command then devolved upon Colonel [R. W.] Harper. By this time Liddell, who was upon the left of Johnson's brigade, had become separated from Cleburne's division by following the movement of McCown. The command was near the Wilkinson turnpike, at a point where the enemy had established a hospital. They had driven them nearly 2 miles. The men were greatly fatigued and their ammunition exhausted. As soon as this was replenished, I ordered them again to advance. Rains' brigade being fresh, was brought forward to the right to attack a battery, while Ector's, McNair's, and Liddell's brigades moved forward in the direction of the Nashville road. Ector and Harper, though enfiladed by a battery, forced their way through a cedar brake in which the enemy were posted, while Rains advanced upon the battery. Unfortunately, this brave officer and accomplished gentleman fell, shot through the heart, and his brigade recoiled in confusion. Ector and Harper were ordered to fall back under cover, while [J. T.] Humphreys' battery bravely engaged sixteen pieces of the enemy until our infantry were sheltered. The divisions of McCown and Cleburne in single line had now driven the enemy, with great slaughter, for several miles through the cedar brakes toward the Nashville turnpike. Cleburne (originally formed with Brigadier-General Polk's brigade on the right, Johnson's in the center, and Liddell's on the left, with Wood's in reserve) had engaged the enemy shortly after McCown commenced the attack. Having changed direction toward the northeast, he encountered their first line, posted behind fences and in dense thickets, a little north of the Triune road. In the open ground beyond were other lines and batteries. Limestone rocks in the thickets furnished the enemy admirable natural defenses. The division dashed forward, and, after a bloody struggle of half an hour, hurled the first line back upon the second, which, in turn, was broken, and the mingled lines were driven in disorder toward the Wilkinson turnpike. Wood's brigade dispersed the One hundred and first Ohio and the brigade composed of the Thirty-eighth Illinois, the Twenty-first, Eighty-first, and Fifteenth Wisconsin. The Seventeenth Tennessee captured a Michigan battery, while the Second Arkansas [Mounted Rifles] again routed the Twenty-second Indiana, capturing its colonel. This regiment is the same that the Second Arkansas had routed at Perryville, and which, during the campaign of last year, had behaved with such barbarity to the people of Arkansas. It was in this conflict that Colonel [A. S.] Marks, of the Seventeenth Tennessee Regiment, was severely wounded while gallantly leading and encouraging his men. It was also in this conflict that Liddell's and Johnson's brigades suffered their greatest loss. The enemy several times attempted to make a stand, but were each time forced back. Our troops were vigorously pressing forward, when a third line, strongly supported by artillery, stood revealed on the south side of the turnpike. The cannonade was fierce, but could not check our advance. After a stubborn combat the enemy were broken, and fled to the cedar brakes between the Nashville and Wilkinson turnpikes. Cleburne was now in advance of Cheatham and Withers, and as he crossed the open grounds near the turnpike he was enfiladed by a battery posted on an eminence directly on his right flank. Captain [T.R.] Hotchkiss, acting chief of artillery of Cleburne's division, placed [J.H.] Calvert's and [Put.] Darden's batteries in position near the Wilkinson turnpike, and boldly engaged some heavy rifled batteries of the enemy. This officer nobly discharged his duty, and was twice wounded. The First Arkansas and the Fifth Confederate afterward charged the batteries, and captured four of the guns. Several colors, a large number of prisoners, medical stores, hospitals, ammunition trains, and caissons, were captured in this conflict. The battle at this point was bloody. Here General [Joshua W.] Sill, of the Federal Army, was slain. Cleburne had now driven back all the forces of the enemy beyond the Wilkinson road, when another line was displayed in the cover of the cedar woods between the Wilkinson and Nashville turnpikes. Wood, Polk, and Johnson charged this line, receiving a heavy fire. Here Lieutenant-Colonel [Don] McGregor, of the First Arkansas, and Major [J. T.] McReynolds, of the Thirty-seventh Tennessee, two brave officers, fell, mortally wounded. Brigadier-General Liddell attacked the enemy near the left of Brigadier-General Johnson, whom he had rejoined, and, after an obstinate conflict, threw them into confusion. Here Col. Samuel [G.] Smith, of the Sixth and Seventh Arkansas, and Colonel [John H.] Kelly, of the Eighth Arkansas, both gallant officers, were wounded; and here Lieutenant-Colonel [John E.] Murray, of the Fifth Arkansas, courageously bore the colors of his regiment to the front, while Private J. K. Leslie, of the same regiment, captured the colors of the enemy with his own hands. A portion of Cleburne's division was repulsed, but, after a bloody combat, the enemy were finally dislodged. On our right their lines remained unbroken. With our inferior numbers no further advance could be hazarded until all my forces were collected. Wood, having fallen back for ammunition, was detained to protect the ordnance train. The remaining brigades occupied the cedar brakes and fields near the Nashville road. The command of Cleburne was now reformed, and about 3 o'clock he essayed again to rout a fresh line of the enemy near the Nashville turnpike. The enemy were again broken with heavy loss. Johnson's brigade was conspicuous in the conflict, in which the brigade of Preston Smith also shared. It was now past 3 o'clock. In moving through the open grounds to drive the enemy from the last positions they held near the railroad, a fierce and destructive enfilading fire of artillery was poured upon the right of Cleburne's division from batteries massed near the railroad embankments. At this critical moment the enemy brought up a fresh line to oppose our wearied troops. Our ammunition was exhausted. Smith's brigade recoiled in confusion. Johnson and Polk followed, and the division was repulsed. It was rallied and reformed in the edge of the cedar woods, about 400 yards in rear of the most advanced position we had won. Brigadier-General Polk in this conflict suffered very severely, but, while we sustained, we inflicted great loss. When I withdrew from the extreme right, Tuesday evening, Major-General Breckinridge's division was left in its original position on the Lebanon road. Brigadier-General Jackson having reported to me with his brigade, it was posted on the east side of the Lebanon road, to the right of Adams' brigade. These five brigades, under Major-General Breckinridge, remained in position from Sunday to Wednesday without any material event, except a skirmish for an artillery position, already mentioned. About 11 o'clock Wednesday the brigades of Adams and Jackson were, in obedience to orders of the commanding general, sent across the river to the assistance of Lieutenant-General Polk, who was reported to be hard pressed. Crossing the ford about midday, they were formed near the intersection of the Nashville Railroad and turnpike, with their right stretching to the river, and were moved down the Nashville turnpike and railroad against the center of the enemy, passing in the direction of the burnt brick building known as the Cowan house. The brigade of Jackson passed by those of Chalmers and Donelson in the direction of the Cowan house, while Adams', extending toward the river, attacked the enemy between 1 and 2 o'clock. A desperate struggle for a passage down the Nashville road ensued just before Cleburne became engaged against their right, 2 miles farther on. The force was unequal to the task. It recoiled after a loss of one-third of the command. A short time after, Preston and Palmer were ordered to cross the ford, to continue the same movement, and Hanson's brigade alone remained on the east side of Stone's River. They reached the ground just after Jackson and Adams were repulsed, General Adams having been wounded while gallantly conducting his brigade. They were quickly formed under the immediate command of Major-General Breckinridge, and moved across the plain in fine order under the fire of the enemy's artillery. Many men and officers were killed along the line, the principal loss falling upon Preston's brigade, the Twentieth Tennessee, of Preston's brigade, vainly endeavored near the river to carry a battery, and, after a heavy loss, including their gallant commander, Colonel [T. B.] Smith, who was severely wounded, was compelled to fall back under cover. Palmer, being farther on the left, suffered but little. The remaining regiments of Preston's brigade encountered great difficulty in passing the fences and pickets at the Cowan house, and, being exposed to an enfilading fire of infantry and artillery at short range, were thrown into some confusion. They were soon rallied, and, rushing forward with cheers across the intervening space, entered the cedar brakes in front. At 4 o'clock our line was almost parallel with the Nashville turnpike for about 2 miles, stretching from the point of woods near the Cowan house toward Overall's Creek. Preston occupied the extreme right of my line, and the divisions of Cleburne and McCown extended northwest, almost parallel with the railroad. Liddell's brigade formed the extreme left. The enemy occupied the ground northwest of the railroad, lying between it and Stone's River, toward Nashville. Here they massed a vast strength of artillery and infantry. Their right had been completely turned, crushed, and beaten back for more than 3 miles. Great confusion prevailed, but their strength was still such that we could not undertake to force the position without unwise hazard. We had lost nearly a third of the commands engaged. If, at the moment when the enemy were driven from the thick woods north of the Wilkinson turnpike, a fresh division could have replaced Cleburne's exhausted troops and followed up the victory, the rout of Rosecrans' army would have been complete. The interval required to collect and reform our lines, now shattered by four successive conflicts, was occupied by the enemy in planting heavy batteries and massing fresh columns of infantry to oppose our further advance. I sent for re-enforcements. The commanding general replied he had none to give me. Hanson's brigade alone remained fresh and un-fought. The enemy lay beyond the range of our guns, securely sheltered behind the strong defense of the railroad embankment, with wide, open fields intervening, which were swept by their superior artillery. It would have been folly, not valor, to assail them in this position. I gave the order to hold the wood, 400 yards in rear of the advanced position we had won, and to bivouac for the night. During the day the men and officers of my command had displayed the most splendid courage. Twenty-three pieces of cannon and more than 4,000 prisoners, with a corresponding number of small-arms, rewarded their valor. With 12,000 men of all arms, we had driven back and utterly routed McCook's corps, ascertained by his captured returns to have been 18,000 strong, and several brigades and divisions which it is known were sent to his support. For 3 miles in our rear, amid the thick cedars and the open fields, where the Federal lines had been originally formed, their dead and their dying, their hospitals, and the wreck of that portion of their army marked our victorious advance. Our bivouac fires were lighted at night within 500 yards of the railroad embankment, behind which their disordered battalions sought shelter. Wednesday night was clear and cold. The armies maintained their relative positions. Some picket skirmishing occurred during the night. No action of importance nor material change of position occurred until about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of Friday, January 2. The commanding general, anxious to secure a position on the east bank of the river, from which he could enfilade the lines of the enemy, ordered Major-General Breckinridge, with his entire division, to seize a hill about 1,600 yards in front of the position occupied by Hanson's brigade. At 4 o'clock the division moved forward. It swept over the crest of the hill, routing a division of the enemy, who fled in disorder across the stream, after leaving many killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our men pursued them with great ardor. A division reported to be that of General [J. S.] Negley, and a brigade under General Porter [Palmer], held the opposite side of the river. This fresh force poured a withering fire from an advantageous position upon our men. Breckinridge's division, after a bloody struggle not exceeding forty minutes, in which at least 1,200 men were killed and wounded, was repulsed. Many brave men and able officers fell in the attack. Among the latter Brigadier-General [R. W.] Hanson, a spirited and intrepid officer, was mortally wounded early in the action. As this movement was made without my knowledge, and under the immediate supervision of Major-General Breckinridge, I refer to his report for de tails. Friday night, the commanding general, apprehending an attack on our right, east of Stone's River, ordered me to withdraw Cleburne's and McCown's divisions from the left, and to place them in their original positions--the former in rear of Breckinridge's line, the latter in reserve. These divisions did not get into position until late that night. Cold and drenching rain set in and continued throughout the succeeding day. The enemy manifested no disposition to attack, but our troops, being worn down by the hardships of their winter bivouacs and the exhaustion of battle, and the commanding general having received information that the enemy were being largely re-enforced, he determined to retire. In obedience to his orders, on the morning of January 4, I withdrew my command by the Manchester road to Tullahoma, in good order and without molestation. It is worthy of remark that at Murfreesborough, whenever the fight was confined principally to musketry, and the enemy had no advantage in artillery, we were successful. It was only when they had massed heavy batteries, under cover of the railroad embankments, that we were repulsed. In every form of contest in which mechanical instruments, requiring skill and heavy machinery to make them, can be used, the Federals are our superiors. In every form of contest in which manly courage, patient endurance, and brave impulse are the qualities and conditions necessary to success, we have invariably been successful. Long-range cannon and improved projectiles can be made only by great mechanical skill, heavy machinery, and abundant resources. The enemy is, therefore, superior in artillery. Infantry constitutes the great arm of the service, and its appointments and equipments are simple. The Federal infantry, unsupported by artillery, has not in a single instance fought successfully with ours when the odds were less than three to two. I herewith inclose a tabular statement (A), which exhibits the losses sustained by the divisions of McCown, Breckinridge, and Cleburne, and the brigades of Jackson and Wharton, amounting to 5,663 in killed, wounded, and missing. To the officers and men of my command I return my heartfelt thanks for the ability and striking courage displayed by them at Murfreesborough. The field required that much should be confided to the commanders of divisions, brigades, and regiments, and it is to me a grateful duty to acknowledge how well these officers merited my confidence. The men illustrated the day by a discipline, courage, and devotion never surpassed. In the reports of my subordinate commanders will be found many instances of individual heroism which the limits of this report will not permit me to record. My thanks are due to the members of my staff, namely: Maj. T. B. Roy, chief of staff; Capt. D. H. Poole, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. D. G. White, acting assistant adjutant-general; Maj. W. D. Pickett, assistant inspector-general; Capt. S. L. Black, assistant inspector-general; Lieut. T. W. Hunt, assistant inspector-general; Lieut. W. W. Wilkins, aide-de-camp; Maj. L. Hoxton, chief of artillery; Maj. J. M. Kennard, chief of ordnance; Surg. A. L. Breysacher, medical inspector; Maj. C W. Gassett, chief quartermaster; Maj. W. E. Moore, chief of subsistence, and to General W. C. Whitthorne, adjutant-general of the State of Tennessee, and Capt. [Maj.] Thomas Claiborne, C. S. Army, who volunteered their services. My thanks are also especially due to Capts. S. W. Presstman and J. W. Green, of the engineer corps, for active and efficient service, and to Surg. D. W. Yandell, my medical director, to whose good management I am indebted for having both my own and the Federal wounded in Wednesday's fight rapidly removed from the field and cared for before midnight.
I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,W. J. HARDEE, Lieutenant-General.

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